Issues and Comments about Object Oriented Technology in Aviation

Issue	Topic	Issue Statement
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1	Dead/ deactivated code	Deactivated Code will be found in any application that uses general purposed libraries or object-oriented frameworks. (Note that this is the case where unused code is NOT removed by smart linkers.)
2	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Flow Analysis, recommended for Levels A-C, is complicated by Dynamic Dispatch (just which method in the inheritance hierarchy is going to be called?).
3	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Timing Analysis, recommended for Levels A-D is complicated by Dynamic Dispatch (just how much time will be expended determining which method to call?).
4	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Requirements Testing, recommended for Levels A-D, and Structural Coverage Analysis, recommended for Levels A-C, are complicated by Inheritance, Overriding and Dynamic Dispatch (just how much of the existing verification of the parent class can be reused in its subclasses?).
5	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Structural Coverage Analysis, recommended for Levels A-C, is complicated by Dynamic Dispatch (just which method in the inheritance hierarchy does the execution apply to?).
6	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Conformance to the guidelines in DO-178B concerning traceability from source code to object code for Level A software is complicated by Dynamic Dispatch (how is a dynamically dispatched call represented in the object code?).
7	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Polymorphic, dynamically bound messages can result in code that is error prone and hard to understand.
8	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Dynamic dispatch presents a problem with regard to the traceability of source code to object code that requires "additional verification" for level A systems as dictated by DO-178B section 6.4.4.2b.
9	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Dynamic dispatch complicates flow analysis, symbolic analysis, and structural coverage analysis.
10	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Inheritance, polymorphism, and linkage can lead to ambiguity.

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20	Inheritance	"A subclass-specific implementation of a superclass method is [accidentally] omitted. As a result, that superclass method might be incorrectly bound to a subclass object, and a state could result that was valid for the superclass but invalid for the subclass owing to a stronger subclass invariant. For example, Object-level methods like is Equal or copy are not overridden with a necessary subclass implementation".
21	Inheritance	"A subclass [may be] incorrectly located in a hierarchy. For example, a developer locates SquareWindow as a subclass of RectangularWindow, reasoning that a square is a special case of a rectangle Suppose that [the method] resize(x, y) is inherited by SquareWindow. It allows different lengths for adjacent sides, which causes SquareWindow to fail after it has been resized. This situation is a design problem: a square is not a kind of a rectangle, or vice versa. Instead both are kinds of four-sided polygons. The corresponding design solution is a superclass FourSidedWindow, of which RectangularWindow and SquareWindow are subclasses."
22	Inheritance	"A subclass either does not accept all messages that the superclass accepts or leaves the object in a state that is illegal in the superclass. This situation can occur in a hierarchy that should implement a subtype relationship that conforms to the Liskov substitution principle."
23	Inheritance	"A subclass computes values that are not consistent with the superclass invariant or superclass state invariants."
24	Inheritance	"Top-heavy multiple inheritance and very deep hierarchies (six or more subclasses) are error-prone, even when they conform to good design practice. The wrong variable type, variable, or method may be inherited, for example, due to confusion about a multiple inheritance structure"
25	Inheritance	The ability of a subclass to directly reference inherited attributes tightly couples the definitions of the two classes.
26	Inheritance	Inheritance can be abused by using it as a "kind of code-sharing macro to support hacks without regard to the resulting semantics"
27	Inheritance	When the same operation is inherited by an interface via more than one path through the interface hierarchy (repeated

		inheritance), it may be unclear whether this should result in a single operation in the subinterface, or in multiple operations.
28	Inheritance	When a subinterface inherits different definitions of the same
20	imicitunee	operation [as a result of redefinition along separate paths], it may
		be unclear whether/how they should be combined in the resulting
		subinterface.
29	Inheritance	Use of multiple inheritance can lead to "name clashes" when
		more than one parent <i>independently</i> defines an operation with the
		same signature.
30	Inheritance	When <i>different</i> parent interfaces define operations with different
		names but compatible specifications, it is unclear whether it
		should be possible to merge them in a subinterface.
31	Inheritance	It is unclear whether the normal overload resolution rules should
		apply between operations inherited from different superinterfaces
		or whether they should not (as in C++).
32	Inheritance	It is important that the overriding of one operation by another and
		the joining of operations inherited from different sources always
		be intentional rather than accidental.
33	Inheritance	Multiple inheritance complicates the class hierarchy
34	Inheritance	Multiple inheritance complicates configuration control
35	Inheritance	When inheritance is used in the design, special care must be taken
		to maintain traceability. This is particularly a concern if multiple
		inheritance is used.
36	Inheritance	Source to object code correspondence will vary between
		compilers for inheritance and polymorphism.
37	Inheritance	Overuse of inheritance, particularly multiple inheritance, can lead
		to unintended connections among classes, which could lead to
		difficulty in meeting the DO-178B/ED-12B objective of data and
		control coupling.
38	Inheritance	Multiple inheritance should be avoided in safety critical, certified
		systems.
39	Inheritance	"Top-heavy multiple inheritance and very deep hierarchies (six or
		more subclasses) are error-prone, even when they conform to
		good design practice. The wrong variable type, variable, or
		method may be inherited, for example, due to confusion about a
		multiple inheritance structure"

40	Inheritance	Reliance on programmer specified optimizations of the
		inheritance hierarchy (invasive inheritance) is potentially error
		prone and unsuitable for safety critical applications.
41	Inheritance	Inheritance, polymorphism, and linkage can lead to ambiguity.
42	Inheritance	Inheritance allows different objects to be treated in the same general way. Inheritance as used in Object Oriented Technology is combining several like things into a fundamental building block. The programmer is allowed to take a group of these like things and refer to them in a general way. One routine can be used for all types that inherit from the fundamental building block. The more often a programmer can use the generic behavior of the parent, the more productive the programmer is. The problem I see is that the generic behavior will not always be precise enough for all the applications, and that critical independent is required to determine
10		applications, and that critical judgement is required to determine when the programmer needs to specialize the behavior of one of the object rather than use the generic. Who will issue that critical judgement? Who will find all the instances where the general case is too far away from the precision required?
43	Inlining	Flow Analysis, recommended for levels A-C, is impacted by Inlining (just what are the data coupling and control coupling relationships in the executable code?). The data coupling and control coupling relationships can transfer from the inlined component to the inlining component.
44	Inlining	Stack Usage and Timing Analysis, recommended for levels A-D, are impacted by Inlining (just what are the stack usage and worst-case timing relationships in the executable code?). Since inline expansion can eliminate parameter passing, this can effect the amount of information pushed on the stack as well as the total amount of code generated. This, in turn, can effect the stack usage and the timing analysis.
45	Inlining	Structural Coverage Analysis, recommended for levels A-C, is complicated by Inlining (just what is the "logical" coverage of the inline expansions on the original source code?). This is generally only a problem when inlined code is optimized. If statements are removed from the inlined version of a component, then coverage

		of the inlined component is no longer sufficient to assert coverage of the original source code.
46	Inlining	Conformance to the guidelines in DO-178B concerning traceability from source code to object code for Level A software is complicated by Inlining (is the object code traceable to the source code at all points of inlining/expansion?). Inline expansion may not be handled identically at different points of expansion. This can be especially true when inlined code is optimized.
47	Inlining	Inlining may affect tool usage and make structural coverage more difficult for levels A, B, and C.
48	Structural coverage	The unrestricted use of certain object-oriented features may impact our ability to meet the structural coverage criteria of DO-178B.
49	Structural coverage	Statement coverage when polymorphism, encapsulation or inheritance is used.
50	Templates	Templates are instantiated by substituting a specific type argument for each formal type parameter defined in the template class or operation. Passing a test suit for some but not all instantiations cannot guarantee that an untested instantiation is bug free.
51	Templates	Nested templates, child packages (Ada), and friend classes (C++) can result in complex code and hard to read error messages on many compilers.
52	Templates	Templates can be compiled using "code sharing" or "macro-expansion". Code sharing is highly parametric, with small changes in actual parameters resulting in dramatic differences in performance. Code coverage, therefore, is difficult and mappings from a generic unit to object code can be complex when the compiler uses the "code sharing" approach.
53	Templates	Macro-expansion can result in memory and timing issues, similar to those identified for inlining.
54	Templates	The use of templates can result in code bloat. Many C++ compilers cause object code to be repeated for each instance of a template of the same type.
55	Tools	How can we meet the structural coverage requirements of DO- 178B with respect to dynamic dispatch? There is cause for

		concern because many current Structural Coverage Analysis tools
		do not "understand" dynamic dispatch, i.e. do not treat it as
		equivalent to a call to a dispatch routine containing a case
		statement that selects between alternative methods based on the
		run-time type of the object.
56	Tools	How can we meet the control and data flow analysis requirements
		of DO-178B with respect to dynamic dispatch?
57	Tools	How can deactivated code be removed from an application when
		general purpose libraries and object-oriented frameworks are used
		but not all of the methods and attributes of the classes are needed
		by a particular application?
58	Tools	How can we enforce the rules that restrict the use of specific OO
		features?
59	Other	Implicit type conversion raises certification issues related to
		source to object code traceability, the potential loss of data or
		precision, and the ability to perform various forms of analysis
		called for by [DO-178B] including structural coverage analysis
		and data and control flow analysis. It may also introduce
		significant hidden overheads that affect the performance and
		timing of the application.
60	Other	Overloading can be confusing and contribute to human error
		when it introduces methods that have the same name but different
		semantics. Overloading can also complicate matters for tools
		(e.g., structural coverage and control flow analysis tools) if the
		overloading rules for the language are overly complex.
61	Other	Loss of traceability due to the translation of functional
		requirements to an object-oriented design.
62	Other	Functional coverage of the low level requirement
63	Other	Philosophy of Functional Software Engineering - Most of the
		training, tools and principles associated with software engineering
		and assurance, including those of RTCA DO-178B, have been
		focused on a software function perspective, in that there is an
		emphasis on software requirements and design and verification of
		those requirements and the resulting design using reviews,
		analyses, and requirements-based (functional) testing, and RBT
		coverage and structural coverage analysis.

		Philosophy of Objects and Operations - Although generally
		loosely and inconsistently defined, OOT focuses on "objects" and
		the "operations" performed by and/or to those objects, and may
		have a philosophy and perspective that are not very conducive to
		providing equivalent levels of design assurance as the current
		"functional" approach.
64	Other	Software/software integration testing is often avoided. The
		position defended by the industry is that the high level of
		interaction between a great number of objects could lead to a
		combinative explosion of test cases.
65	Other	Could there be security concerns related to the use of COTS
		based OOT solutions? Particularly with respect to field loadable
		software, security risks have been mitigated by the unique
		architectures of most current systems.
66	Other	Use of dynamic memory allocation/deallocation and use of
		exception handling were raised as issues by Leanna Rierson in
		her paper "Object-Oriented Technology (OOT) in Civil Aviation
		Projects: Certification Concerns" but are currently missing from
		the list of concerns. If the FAA is concerned about these two
		items, they should be discussed at the workshop.
67	Other	Most OO languages use reference semantics for passing objects
		(e.g. Java only supports reference semantics; C++ also supports
		passing by value but this is rarely used and cannot be used when
		dynamic binding is required). This results in variables being
		aliased to each other. It is difficult to analyse the effect of this
		aliasing on program behaviour because many tools do not allow
		for the possible presence of aliasing. it is also easy for a
		developer to inadvertantly use a shallow copy or equality
		operation where the required semantics can only be achieved by a
		deep copy or equality operation.
68	Dynamic	The selection of the code to implement an operation may depend
	binding/dispatch	upon more than just the run time type of the target object. In
		cases involving binary mathematical operations, for instance,
		this choice typically depends on the run time types of both
		arguments. As explained in [Bruce et al.], [Castagna] and
		[MultiJava], this (and other related situations) are not handled

well by most current OO languages. (A.k.a. "Binary methods problem") References: [Bruce eta al.] Bruce, Kim, Luca Cardelli, Giuseppe Castagna, The Hopkins Object Group, Gary T. Leavens and Benjamin Pierce. On Binary Methods, Iowa State University, technical report #95-08a, December 1995. [Castagna] Castagna, Giuseppe. Object-Oriented Programming: A Unified Foundation, Birkauser, Boston, ISBN: 0-8176-3905-5, 1997 [MultiJava] Clifton, Curtis, Gary T. Leavens, Craig Chambers, and Todd Millstein. "MultiJava: Modular Open Classes and Symmetric Multiple Dispatch for Java", OOPSLA 2000 Conference Proceedings: ACM SIGPLAN Notices, vol. 35, no. 10, October 2000, pp. 130-145. Control flow in OO The use of OO methods typically leads to the creation of many 69 small methods which are physically distributed over a large designs/programs number of classes. This, and the use of dynamic dispatch, can make it difficult for developers to trace critical paths through the application during design and coding reviews. JUSTIFICATION: It is important to be able to specify and review the behavior of the system with respect to scenarios that affect system safety. PROPOSED SOLUTION: This issue can be addressed as follows:: 1) At a modeling level, we can use UML sequence diagrams to specify safety critical scenarios during analysis, and refine these during design (by presenting the steps in the scenario at a greater level of detail). Code can then be generated from the overall UML model and reviewed to ensure it complies with the design level sequence diagram (assuming the tool responsible for code generation is not qualified). The analysis and design level scenarios can be developed as a part of a system level safety

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		assessment, e.g. as system level scenarios that could lead to hazards.
		2) At a source code level, we can use aspects to physically group
		the methods called in such scenarios, so that they appear in a
		single file.
		Note: Although the methods definitions are physically grouped in
		this way in order to create the source code equivalent of an
		analysis or design scenario, they are still associated with different
		classes in accordance with the OO principles of encapsulation and
		data abstraction.
		3) Both 1 and 2, with the generation of aspects from UML
		models.
		RELATED TOPICS : Dynamic dispatch, traceability (of analysis
		to design to code)
70	Traceability	The difference between dead and deactivated code is not always
		clear when using OOT. Without good traceability, identifying
		dead vs. deactivated code may be difficult or impossible.
71	Traceability	When a design contains abstract base classes, portions of the
	,	implementations of these classes may be overridden in more
		specialized subclasses, resulting deactivated code.
72	Traceability	Traceability is made more difficult because there is often a lack
		of OO methods or tools for the full software lifecycle.
73	Other	Formal specification languages are generally accessible only to
		those specially trained to use them. To make formal specifications
		accessible to developers and the authors of test cases, we must
		map such formal specifications to natural language and/or other
		less formal notations (e.g. UML). There, however, is currently no
		well defined means of doing so. This issue applies to both
		preliminary and detailed design.
74	Other	Change impact analysis may be difficult or impossible due to
, .	O thier	difficulty in tracing functional requirements through
		implementation.
75	Other	Limitations of UML may limit how non-functional and cross-
13	Other	cutting requirements of realtime, safety critical, distributed, fault-
		tolerant, embedded systems are captured in UML and traced to
		the design, implementation, and test cases.

76	Other	Configuration management may be difficult in OO systems, causing traceability problems. If the objects and classes are considered configuration items, they can be difficult to trace, when used multiple times in slightly different manners.
77	Traceability	What is "low level requirements" for OO? Affects how we do low-level testing. If we don't know what low-level requirements are, we don't know the appropriate level of testing. * High level = WHAT * Low level = HOW
		Related to issue raised in tools session – relation be between artifacts. Should be addressed in the handbook.
		Should be addressed in the handbook.
78	Traceability	Addressing derived requirements for OO – how does this happen? How is it different than traditional and how does it tie up to the safety assessment. Not really unique for OO.
		Will be addressed when we do the artifact mapping.
79	Traceability	Difficult to identify individual atomic requirements in OO. UML tends to group requirements in a graphical format. Would complicate matters if considered derived. For derived requirements, the entire graph would be passed to the safety folk for evaluation of safety impact.
80	Traceability	Lower levels of decomposition may not be possible for some requirements (e.g., performance requirements). Levels of abstraction may be different than traditional.
81	Traceability	Are there unique challenges for source to object code traceability in non-Level A systems? Where should this be addressed? Multiple tools and ways of addressing s-to-o traceability? (not really new) Beyond what DO-178B requires. More of a "DO-178C" issue. Out of scope for the handbook. Is UML the "source code" for OO?

82	Traceability	Is there another "class" of tool qualification for visual modeling tools to demonstrate the integrity of these tools? Not necessarily automating a step, but are looking to make sure the tool is doing what you want. How to ensure consistency of the tools (validating the tool)? How to validate the tool when changes occur? Typically part of the tool selection process. Concern seems to be addressed by handbook mod.
83	Traceability	Auto-test and code generation tools – what are the concerns when a single tool generates code and test from the same model? The concern is with the independence – same input and same tool. Already covered by DO-178B. Not necessarily OO-specific, but may be more prevalent with OO tools. Need to be addressed in some other document or forum.
84	Traceability	Maintaining tool environment, archives, when licenses are involved is not clear. May need to have some kind of "permanent license" to support safety and continued airworthiness of the aircraft. OO more dependent on tools, but not necessarily an OO-specific issue.
85	Traceability	Maturity/long-term support of tools. Tool manufacturers may not realize the long-life need of tools. Is this a higher risk in the OO environment? Education for both the tool and aviation communities to understand the specific needs for tool manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers. Not necessarily OO-specific, but might be more prevalent with OO.
86	Traceability	Are there other types of OO tools that need to be addressed? Need to anticipate other classes of tools that may come onto the scene. E.g., traceability tool for OO, transformation tools, CM tools, refactoring tools (tool to restructure source code to meet new requirements),
87	Traceability	How does OO life cycle data map to the DO-178B section 11 life cycle data? E.g., What "source code" mean in OO? What is req, design, code? Transition from text-based to model-based artifacts.

		*** May need to clarify this up front in the handbook, when making the tie between DO-178B and the handbook.
88	Traceability	Configuration management and incremental development of OO projects and tools. When CM comes into play during the development process may be different than our current practices, when using an UML tool. Doing more iterations in OO. How to "get credit" on iterations. Not necessarily OO-specific, but might be more prevalent with OO because of the multiple iterations.
89	Traceability	Is dynamic dispatch compatible with DO-178B required forms of static analysis? Mention that dynamic dispatch hinders some forms of static analysis including (see DO-178B section 6.3.4f). Tools can treat this if complete closure exists. DO-178B requires complete closure. In cases of incomplete closure, need to define ways to implement.
90	Traceability	Fundamental pre-requisite language issues need clarification prior to adopting LSP and DBC. How can LSP be implemented using available languages? Strongly consider a language subset that is amenable to use of LSP and DBC. Concern is how far to take this subset.
91	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	Inconsistent Type Use (ITU): When a descendant class does not override any inherited method (i.e., no polymorphic behavior), anomalous behavior can occur if the descendant class has extension methods resulting in an inconsistent inherited state.
92	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	State Definition Anomaly (SDA): If refining methods do not provide definitions for inherited state variables that are consistent with definitions in an overridden method, a data flow anomaly can occur.
93	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	State Definition Inconsistency (SDIH): If an indiscriminately-named local state variable is introduced, a data flow anomaly can result.
94	Dynamic binding/ dispatch	State Defined Incorrectly (SDI): If a computation performed by an overriding method is not semantically equivalent to the computation of the overridden method wrt a variable, a behavior anomaly can result.

95	Dynamic binding/	Indirect Inconsistent State Definition (IISD):
	dispatch	When a descendent adds an extension method that defines an
		inherited state variable, an inconsistent state definition can occur.
96	Dynamic binding/	Anomalous construction behavior (ACB1):
	dispatch	If a descendant class provides an overriding definition of a
		method which uses variables defined in the descendant's state
		space, a data flow anomaly can occur.
97	Dynamic binding/	Anomalous construction behavior (ACB2):
	dispatch	If a descendant class provides an overriding definition of a
		method which uses variables defined in the ancestor's state space,
		a data flow anomaly can occur.
98	Dynamic binding/	Incomplete construction (IC):
	dispatch	If the constructor does not establish initial state conditions and the
		state invariants for new instances of a class, then a state variable
		may have in incorrect initial value or a state variable may not
		have been initialized.
99	Dynamic binding/	State Visibility Anomaly (SVA):
	dispatch	When private state variables exist, if every overriding method in a
		descendant class doesn't call the overridden method in the
		ancestor class, a data flow anomaly can exist.